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I.

INTRODUCTION

Fingerprint identification evidence has helped shape
thousands of criminal cases in America. For over a century, the
practice of “matching” a crime scene print to an inked suspect
print, known as friction ridge analysis, has gained universal
1
acceptance. Proponents of fingerprint identification make three
crucial claims: (1) “every individual possesses a unique and

† Senior Lecturer in Law, Centre for American Legal Studies, Birmingham
City University, U.K. Many thanks to my excellent research assistants Aimee
Martin, Amna Nazir, and Alice Storey. Thanks also to Dr. Haydn Davies for his
encouragement and to Terri Smith for discussing the themes of this paper with
me.
1. See Michael J. Saks, Merlin and Solomon: Lessons from the Law’s Formative
Encounters with Forensic Identification Science, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 1069, 1100–01 (1998).
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2

permanent set of fingerprints;” (2) fingerprint examiners can
identify the donor of a crime scene print (a latent print) “to the
3
exclusion of all others,” (i.e., engage in “individualization”); and
(3) fingerprint identification is infallible and has a zero, or close to
4
zero, error rate. As such, fingerprints are considered “powerful”
5
evidence against defendants.
6
Recently, however, the ability of many forensic disciplines, like
friction ridge analysis, to engage in individualization has been
called into question. There are a number of reasons for this. First,
the increasing tally of DNA exonerations has exposed the frailty of
such disciplines, with invalidated and improper forensic evidence
contributing to nearly half of the wrongful convictions (exonerated
7
by DNA) identified by the Innocence Project to date. According to
Professor Carrie Sperling, “[a]s the number of DNA exonerations
rises, concerns about flaws in the system have turned to a

2. Nathan Benedict, Fingerprints and the Daubert Standard for Admission of
Scientific Evidence: Why Fingerprints Fail and a Proposed Remedy, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 519,
527 (2004) (citing Saks, supra note 1, at 1087).
3. Jacqueline McMurtrie, Swirls and Whorls: Litigating Post-conviction Claims of
Fingerprint Misidentification After the NAS Report, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 267, 273 (2010)
(“The fingerprint literature suggests that examiners testify as follows: Q: How sure
are you that those two prints were made by the same finger? A: Absolutely sure! I
don’t testify to probabilities.” (quoting Scientific Working Group on Friction
Ridge Analysis, Study and Technology, SWGFAST Glossary 12 (Sept. 9, 2003),
http://www.swgfast.org/documents/glossary/030909_Glossary-Consolidated_ver
_1.pdf)).
4. McMurtrie, supra note 3, at 273–74 (“[T]he third premise of fingerprint
identifications is one of ‘infallibility.’ Many in the latent fingerprint community . . .
testify that the ACE-V comparison method has a ‘zero error rate.’ They claim that
when the method is used by well-trained and experienced examiners, no errors
are ever made, so that the method itself is error free. Thus, the claim is that
erroneous identifications are only made by poorly trained or inexperienced
practitioners. In other words, the ‘methodological’ (sometimes called ‘scientific’)
error rate is zero while the ‘practitioner’ (sometimes called ‘human’) error rate is
unknown.”).
5. James S. Liebman et al., The Evidence of Things Not Seen: Non-matches as
Evidence of Innocence, 98 IOWA L. REV. 577, 601 (2013).
6. Many forensic sciences are inferior to DNA analysis, and as such are
known as the “soft sciences.” DAVID MCCLURE, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, FOCUS GROUP
ON SCIENTIFIC AND FORENSIC EVIDENCE IN THE COURTROOM 6–8 (2007),
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/220692.pdf.
7. See The Causes of Wrongful Conviction, INNOCENCE PROJECT,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/causes-wrongful-conviction (last visited Mar.
16, 2016).

8. Cooper_CP (756-790) (Do Not Delete)

5/2/2016 9:26 PM

758

[Vol. 42:756

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

realization that evidence we once thought to be hard proof of
guilt—confessions, eyewitness identifications, bite marks,
8
ballistics—lack reliability.” Second, “DNA evidence has become the
gold-standard” that “has raised the bar as to what is scientifically
9
acceptable for identifying a source ‘to the exclusion of all others.’”
Third, in 2009, the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) produced
a landmark report—Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States:
A Path Forward—which concluded that, “[w]ith the exception of
nuclear DNA analysis . . . [,] no forensic method has been
rigorously shown to have the capacity to consistently, and with a
high degree of certainty, demonstrate a connection between
10
evidence and a specific individual or source.” The NAS Report
made some specific criticisms about friction ridge analysis,
11
including that it was not properly “underpinned.” Soon after the
report was published, the U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged that
12
many forensic sciences are subject to “[s]erious deficiencies.”
Unsurprisingly, defendants began using the NAS Report to bolster
their appeals (and other motions), arguing the report’s findings
supported a claim that fingerprint identification evidence is
unreliable and should not have been (or be) admitted against
13
them. Numerous courts between 2009 and 2011 acknowledged

8. Carrie Sperling, When Finality and Innocence Collide, in CONTROVERSIES IN
INNOCENCE CASES IN AMERICA 139, 157 (Sarah Lucy Cooper ed., 2014).
9. Sarah Lucy Cooper, The Collision of Law and Science: American Court
Responses to Developments in Forensic Science, 33 PACE L. REV. 234, 235–36 (2013)
[hereinafter Collision of Law and Science] (citing NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE
NAT’L ACADS., STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH
FORWARD 8 (2009) [hereinafter NAS Report]).
10. NAS Report, supra note 9, at 7.
11. See id. at 144 (suggesting that, “[t]o properly underpin the process of
friction ridge identification, additional research . . . into ridge flow and crease
pattern distributions” is needed).
12. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 319 (2009).
13. See Wayne G. Plumtree, A Perspective on the Appropriate Weight to Be Given to
the National Academy of Sciences’ Report on Forensics in Evidentiary Hearings: The
Significance of Continued Court Acceptance of Fingerprint Evidence, 42 SW. L. REV. 605,
608–09 (2013) (“[T]he defense bar nationwide utilized the report as a foundation
for motions to exclude fingerprint evidence or to severely restrict expert testimony
. . . .”); see, e.g., United States v. Montalvo-Rangel, No. SA-10-CR-64, 2010 WL
1484708, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 13, 2010), aff’d, 437 F. App’x 316 (5th Cir. 2011)
(relying on the NAS Report to argue that expert testimony of a latent print
examiner was unreliable); see also McMurtrie, supra note 3, at 287–88 (proposing
defendants can use the NAS Report to “refute or preclude [the fingerprint
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the NAS Report, but responded to its criticisms in different ways.
While some courts simply pay “lip service” to the Report, others
have grappled with its methods and more carefully considered its
14
findings. Overall, however, courts continue to strongly favor the
15
admission of fingerprint identification evidence. In doing so, most
courts rely on the adversarial process (i.e., defense counsel’s ability
to weed out frailties in such evidence via cross-examination) to
“resolve and neutralize” any post-NAS Report concerns about the
16
reliability of fingerprint evidence.
By focusing on the role of defense counsel (and the adversarial
system) as a basis for rejecting such appeals, the courts have been
drawing upon an “instrumental” value of finality; namely,
17
incentivizing defense counsel to prevent errors at trial level. As
Professor Erin Murphy states, “[a]s currently configured, our
[criminal justice] system . . . heavily depends upon the skill of
counsel and in-court confrontation rather than out-of-court
18
oversight and structural reform . . . .” The term “finality”
represents the conclusion that a certain set of interests are best
19
served by limiting review.” In addition to incentivizing defense
counsel, “[t]hese interests include ensuring respect for criminal
judgments, conserving state resources, furthering the efficiency
and deterrent and educational functions of criminal law, satisfying
the human need for closure, . . . and preventing a flood of frivolous
20
claims from masking the fewer, credible ones.” This judicial trend
has continued post-2011.

expert’s] claims of infallibility” and “educate the judge and jury”).
14. Collision of Law and Science, supra note 9, at 276–77.
15. See id.
16. Id. at 277.
17. See Andrew Chongseh Kim, Beyond Finality: How Making Criminal
Judgments Less Final Can Further the “Interests of Finality,” 2013 UTAH L. REV. 561, 563
(2013).
18. Erin Murphy, The Mismatch Between Twenty-First-Century Forensic Evidence
and Our Antiquated Criminal Justice System, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 633, 672 (2014).
19. See Kim, supra note 17, at 568.
20. Sarah Lucy Cooper, Judicial Responses to Challenges to Firearms Identification
Evidence: A Need for New Perspectives on Finality, 31 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 457, 459–60
(2014) [hereinafter Challenges to Firearms Identification]; see Paul M. Bator, Finality in
Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 452
(1963); Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal
Judgments, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 142, 159 (1970); Kim, supra note 17, at 563; Sperling,
supra note 8, at 144.
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This article presents a cohort of cases that demonstrate this
pattern in judicial decision-making and highlights the implications
of relying on this finality interest to remedy the problems
21
associated with forensic identification evidence. Part II describes
the process of friction ridge analysis, the NAS Report’s findings
about friction ridge analysis, and some recent efforts to improve
22
the discipline. Part III outlines relevant admissibility frameworks
and judicial responses to challenges to fingerprint evidence
between 2009 and 2014, illustrating the influence of finality on
23
judicial decision making in these cases. Part IV discusses the
24
implications of relying on finality to rationalize such decisions. It
suggests that, in relying on the role of defense counsel and the
adversarial system to rationalize their decisions, courts are
overlooking the limitations of the adversarial system, specifically
the difficulties lawyers have in engaging with scientific evidence
and the problems encountered by their audience (i.e., the jury)
25
when receiving such evidence. As Professor David Faigman stated,
legal consumers of science (including lawyers, judges, jurors, and
other legal personnel) “often have little understanding of the
26
product they are buying.” Part V concludes that the courts should
consider taking new perspectives on finality in such cases, and give
more meaningful consideration to the issues that arise when law
27
consumes science in this way.
II. FRICTION RIDGE ANALYSIS: THE 2009 NATIONAL ACADEMY OF
SCIENCES REPORT AND RECENT RESEARCH EFFORTS
When a person’s hand (or foot) touches a particular surface,
28
the ridges on their skin leave a printed impression on that surface.
Friction ridge analysis, which is the practice of “matching” a latent

21. Notably, a similar pattern is identifiable in firearms identification
evidence cases. See Challenges to Firearms Identification, supra note 20, at 478.
22. See infra Part II.
23. See infra Part III.
24. See infra Part IV.
25. See infra Part IV.
26. DAVID L. FAIGMAN, LEGAL ALCHEMY: THE USE AND MISUSE OF SCIENCE IN THE
LAW 53 (1999).
27. See infra Part V.
28. Commonwealth v. Patterson, 840 N.E.2d 12, 15 (Mass. 2005)
(“Fingerprints are left by the deposit of oil on contact between a surface and the
friction ridges of a finger.”).
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print found at a crime scene to an inked suspect print, has gained
29
universal acceptance. As noted above, proponents of fingerprint
identification make three fundamental claims: fingerprints are
30
unique and unchanging; fingerprint examiners can identify the
31
exact donor of a crime scene print; and such an identification is
32
infallible. The standard method of fingerprint identification
employed by fingerprint examiners in America is the four-stage
33
Analysis-Comparison-Evaluation-Verification (ACE-V) method. An
examiner must have a latent print and a suspect print to conduct
34
an ACE-V examination. The analysis phase involves a “qualitative
and quantitative” evaluation of a fingerprint’s friction ridges at
three levels of detail: (1) flow, or direction of the ridges; (2) an
examination of each individual ridge’s unique characteristics; and
35
(3) a close examination of the pores of the ridges. An examiner
36
first analyzes the latent print, then the suspect print. The
comparison phase requires analysis of the latent and suspect prints
37
to determine if they match. The examiner will study the “friction
ridge detail to determine if the details match in similarity,
38
sequence, and spatial relationship.” There is no specific formula
39
examiners use to determine whether there is a match.

29. Saks, supra note 1, at 1097, 1101, 1110.
30. Benedict, supra note 2, at 527.
31. McMurtrie, supra note 3, at 269.
32. Id. at 273–74.
33. See Patterson, 840 N.E.2d at 14 n.2.
34. See McMurtrie, supra note 3, at 270–71.
35. United States v. Aman, 748 F. Supp. 2d 531, 539 (2010) (“The first level
of detail can be used to exclude, but not to identify, a print, while a combination
of the second and third levels of detail may allow for either identification or
exclusion.”).
36. Id. (“If either the latent or the [suspect] print is unsuitable for
examination, the analysis ends.”).
37. Id.
38. Id. (“[D]ifferences in the fingerprints do not necessarily end the analysis;
rather, the examiner must determine whether the dissimilarity is explainable given
pressure differences, surface texture, print medium (e.g., ink, sweat, or blood),
and other expected variations.”).
39. Id. (“[N]o set number of similarities—sometimes known as ‘points’—
indicates a match, since it is both the quantity and quality of similarities that allow
for identification. Likewise, the number of explained dissimilarities—that is,
dissimilarities believed to be the result of expected variations—is not dispositive
either for or against finding a match.”).
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The third phase in the ACE-V method—evaluation—
requires the examiner to form a conclusion about the
prints. The examiner can conclude that the prints are a
match (known as “individualization” or “identification”),
that they are not a match (known as “exclusion”), or that
the result is inconclusive. Both the comparison and
evaluation phases involve the exercise of judgment by an
examiner based on that examiner’s training and
40
experience.
In the last stage of the ACE-V method—verification—a second
examiner analyzes the same latent and suspect prints in an effort to
41
verify the first examiner’s conclusion.
The NAS Report acknowledged that friction ridge analysis has
long “served as a valuable tool, both to identify the guilty and to
42
exclude the innocent,” and gave some support to the discipline’s
43
ability to engage in individualization. “Because of the amount of
detail available in friction ridges,” the NAS opined, “it seems
plausible that a careful comparison of two impressions can
44
accurately discern whether or not they had a common source.”
The Report agreed that “[s]ome scientific evidence supports the
presumption that friction ridge patterns are unique to each person
45
and persist unchanged throughout a lifetime.” However, the
Report also found that the discipline was not “properly
46
underpin[ned].” The NAS Report’s criticism spanned four areas.
First, ACE-V “is not specific enough to qualify as a validated
method” because it “does not guard against bias; is too broad to
ensure repeatability and transparency; and does not guarantee that
47
two analysts following it will obtain the same results.” Thus, an
examiner is not “proceeding in a scientific manner or producing
48
reliable results” by simply applying ACE-V. Second, examiners
49
need to better document their analysis. Third, claims of a zero

40.
41.

Id.
Id. Interestingly, the second examiner knows the first examiner’s results.

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

NAS Report, supra note 9, at 142.
See id. at 136.
Id. at 142.
Id. at 143–44.
Id. at 144.
Id. at 142.
Id.
Id. at 143 (“Better documentation is needed of each step in the ACE-V

Id.
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50

error-rate are clearly “unrealistic.” Fourth, more research is
needed into ridge patterns and distribution, discriminating values,
51
and items “that affect the quality of latent prints.” However, it
should be noted that the NAS Report itself, and in particular its
52
assessment of friction ridge analysis, has been criticized.
Courts have subsequently acknowledged that the forensic
science community has started to take steps to respond to the
53
findings of the NAS Report. More recently, these efforts have
continued. For instance, in relation to friction ridge analysis, in
2012, “a large multidisciplinary collective—the Expert Working
Group on Human Factors in Latent Print Analysis . . . was

process or its equivalent. At the very least, sufficient documentation is needed to
reconstruct the analysis, if necessary.”).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 144–45 (acknowledging that some research has recently begun
regarding “ridge flow and crease pattern distribution on the hands and feet” and
“the discriminating value of the various ridge formations and clusters of ridge
formations”).
52. See Plumtree, supra note 13, at 658.
The NAS Committee did voluntarily undertake a difficult mission. The
report addressed various diverse forensic disciplines in conjunction
with heretofore unaddressed aspects of forensic science. A majority of
the suggestions offered, such as universal examiner certification,
laboratory accreditation, universal minimum training, and uniform
terminology will have a positive effect on forensic science in general,
even if not fully implemented. Considering the scope of the report, it is
not surprising that there would be some problematic areas. The
fingerprint community is not the only discipline that has challenged
the findings in the NAS Report. Possibly in the near future, the
National Academy of Sciences will issue a follow-up report with
corrections, as was done following the National Academy of Sciences’
first report on DNA. It is unfortunate that the NAS Report contains
flaws concerning some areas of fingerprint analyses, but this is a
limitation that must be considered. To properly serve justice, the
weight given the National Academy of Sciences’ Report, Strengthening
Forensic Science in the United States: A Path Forward, will have to be
carefully calibrated to the specific issue.
Id. at 658–60 (citations omitted).
53. For instance, in United States v. Love, a U.S. District Court in California
recognized that the NAS Report criticized some aspects of fingerprint analysis, but
denied Love’s challenge to the admission of fingerprint evidence against him. No.
10cr2418-MMM, 2011 WL 2173644 (S.D. Cal. June 1, 2011). The court based its
conclusion, in part, on precedent and on evidence that “the forensic science
community generally . . . ha[s] begun to take appropriate steps to respond to
[the] criticism [contained in the NAS Report].” Id. at *8.
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sponsored by the National Institute of Standards and Technology
and the National Institute of Justice to investigate human factors in
54
latent fingerprint identification.” Recommendations of the
working group are as follows:
The authors recommended that examiners should be
familiar with human factors issues such as fatigue, bias,
cognitive and perceptual influences, and not state that
errors are inherently impossible or that a method
inherently has a zero error rate. They recommend that
management foster a culture in which it is understood
that some human error is inevitable and that a
comprehensive testing program of competency and
proficiency should be developed and implemented.
Speaking generally, and taking the lead from medical and
aviation research, the authors advocate that fingerprint
identification would benefit from the human factors
research and systems approaches to improve quality and
productivity, and reduce the likelihood and consequences
55
of human error.
As a result of such reports and scholarly criticism, the working
group noted that “research into fingerprint identification is well
56
underway.” For example, “[r]esearchers have investigated the
effect of contextual bias on fingerprint examiners, the special
abilities and vulnerabilities of fingerprint examiners, the
psychophysics of fingerprint identification, the effect of
57
technology, and statistical models of fingerprint identification.”
Studies have also “been conducted to directly address the matching
58
accuracy and expertise of examiners.”
At a national level, efforts have been made to make more
holistic improvements to forensic science. For instance, in January
2014, the U.S. Department of Justice and the National Institute of
Standards and Technology appointed members to the newly
59
created National Commission on Forensic Science. Members of

54. Matthew B. Thompson, Jason M. Tangen & Duncan J. McCarthy, Human
Matching Performance of Genuine Crime Scene Latent Fingerprints, 38 L. & HUM. BEHAV.
84, 85 (2014).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. (citation omitted).
58. Id.
59. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, U.S. Departments of Justice and
Commerce Name Experts to First-Ever National Commission on Forensic Science
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the Commission are charged with collaborating “to improve the
practice of forensic science by developing guidance concerning the
intersections between forensic science and the criminal justice
60
system.”
The
Commission
also
“develop[s]
policy
recommendations for the U.S. Attorney General, including
uniform codes for professional responsibility and requirements for
61
formal training and certification.” The Commission has now
started its work and created sub-committees working on issues
relating to accreditation, the impact of human factors, testimony
and reporting, interim solutions, death investigations, wider
62
research, and training in science and law. In February 2014, a bill
for the Forensic Science and Standards Act of 2014 was introduced
63
in the Senate. The Act was aimed at improving forensic science by
encouraging research, adopting standards, and creating
64
accreditation requirements. It was reported by the Committee on
65
April 9, 2014, but it later died in Congress.
Evidently, the NAS Report spurred a series of actions in
scientific, political, policy, and academic spheres, all of which are
aimed at improving forensic science (and, in particular, the legal
system’s use of it). The Report was also billed as a “blockbuster”
report that would overhaul “the legal landscape regarding forensic
66
evidence.” Therefore, as expected, defendants started to use the
NAS Report to bolster their appeals and other motions, arguing the
Report’s findings supported their arguments that fingerprint
identification evidence was unreliable and should not have been
(or should not be) admitted against them. However, the courts
have largely rejected such challenges, relying on the adversary
67
process. Part III examines this pattern in judicial decision making
between 2009 and 2014, and it illustrates the influence of finality
on judicial rationales.

(Jan. 10, 2014).
60. Id.
61. Id.
JUSTICE,
http://www.justice.gov/ncfs
62. See
Subcommittees,
DEP’T
/subcommittees (last updated Oct. 27, 2015).
63. Forensic Science and Standards Act of 2014, S. 2022, 113th Cong. (2014).
64. Id.
65. See S. 2022 (113th): Forensic Science and Standards Act of 2014, GOVTRACK.US
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/s2022 (last visited Mar. 17, 2016).
66. McMurtrie, supra note 3, at 267.
67. Collision of Law and Science, supra note 9, at 277.

8. Cooper_CP (756-790) (Do Not Delete)

5/2/2016 9:26 PM

766

[Vol. 42:756

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

III. JUDICIAL RESPONSES TO CHALLENGES TO FINGERPRINT
IDENTIFICATION EVIDENCE BETWEEN 2009 AND 2014 AND THE
INFLUENCE OF FINALITY
Fingerprint identification evidence has been admitted into
68
U.S. courtrooms for over a century. In that time, the discipline has
satisfied both of the leading standards for the admissibility of
expert evidence, namely the “general acceptance” standard set out
69
in Frye v. United States in 1923 and the “flexible, factor-based
70
approach” detailed in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,
71
in 1993. At present, Daubert generally governs the admissibility of
72
scientific expert evidence in the United States. Daubert charges
judges to examine the principles and methodology of proffered
scientific evidence, not just whether its conclusions are generally
accepted in the scientific community. In Daubert, the U.S. Supreme
Court listed five factors that courts should consider when analyzing
the reliability of expert testimony: (1) “whether a method can be

68. Bonnie Lanigan, Firearms Identification: The Need for a Critical Approach to,
and Possible Guidelines for, the Admissibility of “Ballistics” Evidence, 17 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL
& APP. ADVOC. 54, 57 (2012).
69. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
70. Collision of Law and Science, supra note 9, at 242.
71. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593–94
(1993); see also Collision of Law and Science, supra note 9, at 242 n.47. This author
has previously explained that
[l]ower courts struggled to interpret Daubert, causing the Supreme
Court to clarify its ruling in two subsequent cases. In [General Electric]
Co. v. Joiner, the Court determined that an appellate court, reviewing a
trial court’s decision to admit or exclude expert testimony under
Daubert should apply the “abuse of discretion” standard. In so holding,
the Supreme Court limited the role of appellate courts in deciding
whether to admit or exclude expert evidence, and emphasized that the
main “gate-keeping” power remained with the trial judge. In Kumho
Tire v. Carmichael, the Justices held that Daubert applied to all expert
testimony, not just scientific testimony. This silenced claims that
Daubert did not apply to the soft sciences. The Justices also held that
trial courts may consider the five Daubert factors to the extent they are
relevant. In other words, the Supreme Court did not endorse strict
application of the Daubert factors.
Id. (citations omitted).
72. Some states continue to apply the Frye standard, or, indeed their own
specific standard. See, e.g., Goeb v. Tharaldson, 615 N.W.2d 800, 814 (Minn. 2000)
(noting that Minnesota has adopted a dual Frye-Mack standard and explicitly
rejected the Daubert standard).
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(and has been) tested;” (2) “the known or potential rate of error;”
(3) “whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer
review;” (4) whether there are “standards controlling the
technique’s operation;” and (5) the “general acceptance” of the
73
method within the relevant community.
Prior to the publication of the NAS Report, a number of courts
had—to differing degrees and by using different approaches to
Daubert—expressed some concern about the practice of fingerprint
74
identification. The following cases demonstrate how courts
considered the NAS Report in the three years after its publication
and showcase how finality influenced judicial decision-making.
A.

Judicial Responses Between 2009 and 2011

In December 2009, Brian Rose challenged the admissibility of
fingerprint evidence that allegedly linked him to a fatal carjacking.
In United States v. Rose, a Maryland court ruled that precedent—the
general acceptance of the ACE-V method in the fingerprint
scientific community—and the lack of evidence to contradict the
conclusion that misidentifications were extremely rare favored
75
admission. The court acknowledged the NAS Report’s use of a
study that found there was no “available scientific evidence of the
76
validity of the ACE-V method.” However, the court emphasized
that the Report “did not conclude that fingerprint evidence was
77
unreliable such as to render it inadmissible,” and its architects did
not intend to answer “whether forensic evidence in a particular
78
case is admissible under applicable law.” In so holding, the court
emphasized the U.S. Supreme Court’s view in Daubert that
“[v]igorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence,
and careful instruction on the burden of proof” are the

73. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593–95.
74. See United States v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215, 235–46 (3d Cir. 2004); United
States v. Crisp, 324 F.3d 261, 268–70 (4th Cir. 2003); United States v. Llera Plaza,
188 F. Supp. 2d 549, 560–76 (E.D. Pa. 2002), vacated, 179 F. Supp. 2d 492 (E.D. Pa.
2002); Commonwealth v. Patterson, 840 N.E.2d 12, 20–22 (Mass. 2005), overruled
on other grounds by Commonwealth v. Britt, 987 N.E.2d 558 (Mass. 2013); Collision of
Law and Science, supra note 9, at 248.
75. United States v. Rose, 672 F. Supp. 2d 723, 725–26 (D. Md. 2009).
76. Id. at 725.
77. Id.
78. Id. (citations omitted).
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“appropriate methods of attacking perceived flaws in admissible
79
scientific or technical evidence.”
The Supreme Court of Massachusetts considered the NAS
80
Report in more detail in Commonwealth v. Gambora in 2010. After
being convicted of murder and related offenses, Gambora used the
NAS Report to challenge evidence that “matched” his fingerprints
to latent prints found on a door. The court acknowledged, in
relative depth, the concerns raised about the reliability of
81
fingerprint identification in the NAS Report. These included the
82
subjective and impure nature of ACE-V, the lack of a quantifiable
83
error rate, and the need for more extensive research to underpin
84
the discipline. However, the court emphasized that the NAS
Report had not argued for, and did not result in, the wholesale
85
exclusion of fingerprint evidence. With regards to crossexamination, the court recognized some limitation on its impact:
While we normally leave the humbling of inflated
opinions to cross-examination, there is a danger that the
mystique of fingerprint identification, which has had a
captivating hold on the criminal justice system and society
at large for more than one hundred years, is such that
cross-examination may not be enough to rectify the effect
of a fingerprint expert’s use of such terms as
“individualized,” “absolute,” and “match” when testifying,
as opposed to presenting the testimony as his or her
“opinion” that the latent fingerprints are the
86
defendant’s.
However, commenting that defense counsel had done
87
“exemplary” work, the court admitted the evidence. Notably,
although the Gambora court did not overlook the limitations of

79. Id. at 724–25 (citing United States v. Crisp, 324 F.3d 264, 268–70 (4th
Cir. 2003)).
80. Commonwealth v. Gambora, 933 N.E.2d 50 (2010).
81. Id. at 58–60.
82. Id. at 58–59.
83. Id. at 60.
84. Id. at 58 n.11.
85. Id. at 58.
86. Id. at 66.
87. Id. (Spina, J., concurring). It is important to note that the Gambora
decision was somewhat directed by the fact that the defendant testified at trial that
he “put his hand on the door in question.” Id. at 61. Other evidence also
connected the defendant to the scene of the robbery and homicide. Id.
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cross-examination, it still overlooked the difficulties a jury might
88
have in digesting such evidence. As discussed later, there is ample
evidence that jurors are easily seduced by experts, and as a
consequence, pay little attention to the veracity of the discipline
89
they are tasked with judging. In the context of fingerprint
identification, for example, studies have found that a vast majority
90
of jurors agree that fingerprint identification is a “science” and
91
that fingerprints are the most reliable means of identification.
Moreover, despite being a typical ruling, Gambora made two
important impacts. First, it highlighted that some of the NAS
Report’s conclusions are confusing. The court stated,
As our discussion of the NAS Report reflects, there is
tension in the report between its assessments that, on the
one hand, “it seems plausible that a careful comparison of
two impressions can accurately discern whether or not
they had a common source,” but that, on the other,
“merely following the steps of ACE-V does not imply that
one is proceeding in a scientific manner or producing
92
reliable results.”
93
The court felt unable to resolve this tension in Gambora.
Second, Gambora represents the first restriction on fingerprint
identification evidence as a direct consequence of the NAS Report.
The court said,
[B]ased on the NAS Report, we can say this much at the
present time: Testimony to the effect that a latent print
matches, or is “individualized” to, a known print, if it is to
be offered, should be presented as an opinion, not a fact,
and opinions expressing absolute certainty about, or the

88. See infra Part IV.
89. See Simon A. Cole, Grandfathering Evidence: Fingerprint Admissibility Rulings
from Jennings to Llera Plaza and Back Again, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1189, 1199 (2004)
(describing how the nature of fingerprint analysis may be taken as absolute
because of the unique nature of fingerprints).
90. Charles Illsley, Address at the International Symposium on Latent Prints
(1987) (finding that 93% of jurors agree that fingerprint identification is a
science, and only 2% disagree).
91. Id. at 19 (finding that 85% of potential jurors agree that “fingerprints are
the most reliable means of identifying a person,” and only 8% disagree).
92. Gambora, 933 N.E.2d at 61 n.22 (citing NAS Report, supra note 9, at 142).
93. Id.
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infallibility of, an “individualization” of a print should be
94
avoided.
In United States v. Aman, Aman moved to exclude fingerprint
95
evidence that allegedly linked him to an arson fire. The Aman
court opined that “[t]he absence of a known error rate, the lack of
population studies, and the involvement of examiner judgment all
raise important questions about the rigorousness of friction ridge
96
analysis.” The court acknowledged the NAS Report’s concern that
the discipline had not been subjected to population studies to
97
demonstrate its precision. With regards to error rate, the court
noted, “[W]hile fingerprint experts sometimes use terms like
‘absolute’ and ‘positive’ to describe the confidence of their
matches, the [NAS Report] has recognized that a zero-percent
98
error rate is ‘not scientifically plausible.’” The court agreed that
further testing and study would enhance the precision and
99
reviewability of fingerprint examiners’ work. Still, relying on Crisp,
the court held that Aman’s challenge was appropriate for cross100
101
examination, and not grounds for exclusion.

94. Id. However, it should be noted that the court also concluded that
“nothing in this [Gambora] opinion should be read to suggest that the existence of
the NAS Report alone will require Daubert-Lanigan hearings as to the general
reliability of expert opinions concerning fingerprint identifications.” Id.
95. United States v. Aman, 748 F. Supp. 2d 531, 532 (E.D. Va. 2010).
96. Id. at 541.
97. Id. at 540 (“[S]tudies on friction ridge analysis to date have not yielded
accurate population statistics. In other words, while some may assert that no two
fingerprints are alike, the proposition is not easily susceptible to scientific
validation.”).
98. Id. (citing NAS Report, supra note 9, at 142).
99. Id. at 541.
100. Id. at 534 (“[T]he Daubert inquiry focuses on the reliability of the expert’s
principles and methodology, rather than the conclusions generated.”).
101. The Aman court relied on the Crisp court’s view that
the district court heard testimony to the effect that the expert
community has consistently vouched for the reliability of the
fingerprinting identification technique over the course of decades. . . .
The district court also heard evidence from which it was entitled to
find the existence of professional standards controlling the technique’s
operation. Those standards provide adequate assurance of consistency
among fingerprint analyses. Finally, the court heard testimony that
fingerprint identification has an exceedingly low rate of error, and the
court was likewise within its discretion in crediting that evidence.
United States v. Crisp, 324 F.3d 261, 269 (4th Cir. 2003).
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In 2011, Donny Love challenged the admission of fingerprint
evidence that allegedly connected him to the 2008 bombing of a
102
federal courthouse in San Diego. In that challenge, a U.S. District
Court in California recognized that the NAS Report criticized some
103
aspects of fingerprint analysis, but denied Love’s motion to
104
exclude such evidence against him. In so holding, the court used
yet a different overall approach to Daubert. The court based its
conclusion, in part, on precedent and on evidence that “the
forensic science community generally . . . ha[s] begun to take
appropriate steps to respond to that criticism [contained in the
105
NAS Report].” With regard to error rate, the court cited a “May
2011 study of the performance of 169 fingerprint examiners[,
which] revealed a total of six false positives among 4,083
comparisons of non-matching fingerprints for ‘an overall false
106
positive rate of 0.1%.’” With regard to controlling standards, “the
court acknowledge[d] that the standards used in fingerprint
analysis ‘[were] insubstantial’” compared to those employed by
107
scientific disciplines. The Love court found that the procedural
nature of the ACE-V method—in this case, in the context of the
FBI—and the stringent qualification process for FBI examiners
108
favored admission. The Love court departed from precedent in its
consideration of “general acceptance,” finding the factors only “at
109
least weakly” supported admission. The court found that Love’s
argument that the “NAS [R]eport’s criticisms of latent fingerprint
analysis in general and the ACE-V methodology in particular
demonstrate that friction ridge analysis is not accepted in the
110
relevant scientific community” contained a “kernel of truth.”
Thus, the court agreed that the NAS Report “demonstrate[d] some
hesitancy in accepting latent fingerprint analysis on the part of the
111
broader scientific community.” However the court did not reject
102. United States v. Love, No. 10cr2418-MMM, 2011 WL 2173644 (S.D. Cal.
June 1, 2011). Notably this is not a post-conviction case, but it is included as a
helpful illustration of post-NAS judicial decision making in this area.
103. Id. at *7.
104. Id. at *10.
105. Id. at *8.
106. Id. at *5.
107. Id. at *6.
108. Id. at *6–7.
109. Id. at *7.
110. Id.
111. Id.
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“general acceptance” entirely because “forensic science and law
enforcement communities strongly support the use of friction ridge
112
analysis.” The court concluded, “Friction ridge analysis is not
foolproof, but it is also far removed from the types of ‘junk science’
113
that must be excluded under . . . Daubert.” Notably, this is
contrary to one scholar’s view that the “‘gold standard’ in
identification [of fingerprinting] now appears to be more akin to
114
. . . ‘fool’s gold.’”
Cementing its decision, the Love court
underscored that the state’s expert “will be subject to crossexamination about her background, methods, analysis,
115
conclusions, and latent fingerprint analysis generally.”
In Pettus v. United States, the appellant used the NAS Report to
challenge forensic evidence that his handwriting matched the
116
writing on a note found on the victim’s body. This is relevant to
fingerprint identification because Pettus aimed his challenge at the
ACE-V method, as this is the methodology the FBI also employs in
117
handwriting analysis. In rejecting Pettus’ claim, the court stated:
As in all such cases, however, it is important . . . that
appellant was not denied a second opportunity to
challenge FBI examiner Maldonado’s expert opinion, this
time before the jury. Rejecting the view of those “overly
pessimistic about the capabilities of the jury and of the
adversary system generally,” the Supreme Court has
reminded us that “[v]igorous cross-examination,
presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction
on the burden of proof are the traditional and
appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible
evidence.” As the trial judge said in concluding his
exemplary analysis here: “I fully expect the defense to
conduct a thorough cross-examination that will expose
any and all inadequacies and points of unreliability of the
ACE-V method as a general matter, as well as the . . .

112. Id.
113. Id. at *8.
114. Brooke G. Malcom, Comment, Convictions Predicated on DNA Evidence
Alone: How Reliable Evidence Became Infallible, 38 CUMB. L. REV. 313, 328 (2008).
115. Love, 2011 WL 2173644, at *9.
116. Pettus v. United States, 37 A.3d 213, 226–27 (D.C. 2012). This author did
not consider this case in her 2013 article. See Collision of Law and Science, supra note
9.
117. Pettus, 37 A.3d at 227.
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inadequacies and points of . . . unreliability in the
118
application of that method in this case.”
119
demonstrated that courts generally
The above cases
acknowledge the NAS Report; however, they engage with and
118. Id. at 228–29 (quoting Daubert v. United States, 509 U.S. 579, 596
(1993)).
119. There were a few other post-NAS Report cases that very briefly
acknowledge the Report between 2009 and 2011. In August 2011, after being
convicted of first degree murder, Edward Mitchell challenged the fingerprint
evidence against him. People v. Mitchell, 955 N.E.2d 1180, 1181 (Ill. App. Ct.
2011). In Mitchell, the Illinois Appellate Court found that (1) the trial court did
not err by admitting expert testimony that failed to account for eight of the
thirteen points allegedly found between defendant’s print and the suspect print;
and (2) the trial court did not err by failing to conduct an admissibility hearing
concerning the methodology used by the relevant fingerprint expert. Id. at 1190.
The court made no substantive mention of the NAS Report’s findings, but in his
dissent, Judge Robert Gordon appeared to follow the NAS Report’s findings in
that he berated the experts involved for not making notes of their processes and
conclusions. Id. (Gordon, J., dissenting). In United States v. Gutierrez-Castro, the
defendant came before a U.S. District Court in New Mexico. 805 F. Supp. 2d 1218,
1218 (D.N.M. 2011). In that case, Castro was accused with reentry of a removed
alien, and the state wanted to introduce the testimony of James McNutt. Id. at
1222. McNutt would testify that suspect prints belonged to Castro. Id. Castro used
the NAS Report in a very narrow sense. See id. at 1228. Castro argued that,
“because there are no standardized methods of accreditation or the necessary
training to reduce errors, and because McNutt has not taken a class since 2004, he
is not qualified to offer expert testimony about fingerprint analysis.” Id. Without
engaging the NAS Report, the court rejected Castro’s argument, seemingly siding
with the state’s argument that McNutt had undergone demanding training with
regular proficiency tests. Id. at 1228–29. Like other courts, the Castro court was not
deterred by the fact that most proficiency tests do not reflect real-life conditions.
The court agreed that the error rate, controlling standards, and general
acceptance of fingerprint identification favored admission. Id. at 1232. Like in
Love, the court found that the testing of the discipline was only “somewhat in favor
of admissibility.” Id. at 1231. It also found that “peer review” was not in favor of
admissibility. Id. The court’s overall conclusion, however, was qualified. The court
gave permission for McNutt to testify, but would not allow (1) the state to “offer
McNutt as an expert witness in the jury’s presence;” (2) the trial court to “certify
McNutt as an expert witness in the jury’s presence;” or (3) “the jury instructions
. . . [to] refer to McNutt as an expert witness.” Id. at 1235. In December 2011, in
United States v. Watkins, 450 Fed. App’x 511 (6th Cir. 2011), Eric Watkins
challenged the district court’s decision to admit fingerprint evidence that linked
him to various crimes. Specifically, Watkins challenged the state’s expert who
claimed that when ACE-V “is used properly by a competent examiner, the error
rate for identification is zero.” Id. at 513. In support, Watkins cited the NAS
Report’s conclusion that such claims were unrealistic. Id. at 515. The Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals rejected Watkins’ argument on two grounds. Id. First, the court
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respond to the NAS Report’s criticisms of fingerprint identification
120
to different degrees. In all of these cases, however, judges have
underscored the role of defense counsel and the adversarial system
as a mechanism for weeding out frailties in such evidence. In the
2013 article, The Collision of Law and Science: American Court Responses
to Developments in Forensic Science, involving challenges to fingerprint
identification evidence decided between 2004 and 2011, this
author concluded that “[o]verall, post-NAS Report courts have . . .
relied on precedent and the adversary process to resolve and
neutralize their concerns about the reliability of fingerprint
121
evidence in the light of the NAS Report.”
There was also evidence that pre-NAS Report courts had
122
rationalized their decisions in the same way. As such, the cohort
said that it would not consider evidence, namely the NAS Report, which was not
before the district court. Id. Second, the court reasoned that even “assuming
arguendo that the ACE-V method is not error-free, the fact that the fingerprint
examiner testified that it was 100% accurate does not by itself mean that the
district court erred in determining that the ACE-V method was scientifically valid.”
Id. The court declined to hold that the allegedly mistaken error-rate testimony
“negates the scientific validity of the ACE-V method given all the other factors that
the district court was required to consider.” Id. at 516.
120. See Collision of Law and Science, supra note 9, at 276–77.
121. Id. at 277. This author also concluded that
[p]ost-NAS Report courts have: (1) made decisions to restrict
testimony directly as a result of the NAS Report; (2) been more critical
of the ability of fingerprint evidence to satisfy Daubert than pre-NAS
Report courts, . . . [but not denied] admission of fingerprint evidence
because of the NAS Report’s findings; (3) placed emphasis on the NAS
Report’s position that it did not intend to answer the question of
whether forensic evidence in a particular case is admissible under
applicable law; (4) responded favorably to attempts by the forensic
community to fill the gaps identified by the NAS Report; [and] (5)
highlighted areas of contradiction in the NAS Report’s conclusions.
Id. at 276–77.
122. See, e.g., United States v. Crisp, 324 F.3d 261, 261 (4th Cir. 2003). Crisp
had been convicted of a bank robbery based, in part, on expert testimony that his
right palm had produced a print recovered from a confession note. Id. at 265.
Crisp challenged the admission of the testimony under Daubert. Id. at 267. The
majority rejected Crisp’s claims. Id. at 267–70. It found that precedent favored
admission; the principles underlying fingerprint identification bore the
“imprimatur of a strong general acceptance,” the discipline had adequate
standards controlling its operation because “fingerprint analysts are held to a
consistent ‘points and characteristics’ approach to identification,” examiners
undergo proficiency tests, and the state’s expert testified that the discipline had an
“essentially zero” error-rate. Id at 268–69. The majority conceded that “further
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of cases demonstrated that finality and in particular, the finality
interest related to incentivizing defense counsel, significantly
influenced judicial decision making in this area.
B.

Judicial Responses Between 2012 and 2014

U.S. courts have continued to draw upon this value of finality
between 2012 and 2014. The following cases demonstrate this.
In the 2012 case of State v. Sheehan, the court allowed an
123
appellant to challenge fingerprint evidence. This is rare and
showcases how highly the courts value the adversarial process. In
this case, Sheehan argued: (1) “the trial court abused its discretion
when it failed to hold [an admissibility] hearing to determine
whether to admit the [s]tate’s expert testimony that a palm print
found at the scene matched Sheehan’s palm print;” and (2) the
trial court erred in its exclusion of Sheehan’s expert’s testimony, as
well as its limitation of “Sheehan’s cross-examination of the state’s
124
experts.”
The appeals court agreed with the trial court’s
admissibility decision but ruled that the trial court erred with
125
regards to restricting cross-examination of the state’s expert. The
court stated, “In depriving a person of life or liberty, . . . due
process [is] . . . [a] fair opportunity to submit evidence, examine
126
and cross-examine witnesses.”
“Thus, the trial court’s legal
determination that the [s]tate’s expert testimony was admissible
did not allow the court to then impinge on the jury’s role as fact
finder by excluding the evidence that Sheehan may have used to
challenge the credibility and weight of the [s]tate’s expert
127
testimony.” Without appropriate justification, “exclusion of this
kind of exculpatory evidence . . . deprives a defendant of the basic
right to have the prosecutor’s case encounter and survive the
128
crucible of meaningful adversarial testing.” Sheehan was given a
research . . . and the development of even more consistent professional standards
is desirable,” but found “[v]igorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary
evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and
appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.” Id. at 269–70.
123. State v. Sheehan, 273 P.3d 417, 422–23 (Utah Ct. App. 2012).
124. Id. at 420.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 426 (quoting Christiansen v. Harris, 163 P.2d 314, 317 (Utah
1945)).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 427.
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new trial. By contrast, the vast majority of cases reject appeals of
this nature and rely on the adversarial process to protect
defendants.
In United States v. Stone, Stone moved to exclude expert
130
testimony using the NAS Report. He argued that the discipline
131
did not satisfy Daubert. In rejecting Stone’s motion, the court
found that “concerns about the risks of error such as false positive
identifications go to the weight of the evidence and can be
explored on cross-examination and/or through presentation of
competing evidence,” and that related issues were more
132
appropriate for the jury. Citing a D.C. District Court decision, the
court agreed that,
[w]hen a principle is well-established, the questions are
simply whether the expert properly applied the
established scientific principle to the facts and whether
the expert’s credibility is compromised for reasons such as
bias. These are matters that a jury usually is competent to
evaluate after cross-examination and presentation of
133
competing expert testimony.
The court underscored its decision by stating, “The gatekeeper
role must not supplant the adversary system or the role of the
134
jury.”
In Gee v. United States, the defendant appealed his convictions
for a variety of burglary-related offenses. He argued that the trial
court had “improperly preclud[ed] the use and admission” of the
135
NAS Report by his defense. Defense counsel wished to crossexamine the government’s fingerprint expert using the Report
because part of the state’s case was that Gee was the donor of prints
136
found at the crime scene. The appeals court ruled that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in declining to take judicial
129. Id. at 430.
130. United States v. Stone, 848 F. Supp. 2d 714, 716 (E.D. Mich. 2012).
131. Id. at 716–17.
132. Id. at 719.
133. Id. (quoting United States v. Cooper, 91 F. Supp. 2d 79, 82 (D.D.C.
2000)).
134. Id. (“Vigorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and
careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate
means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.” (quoting Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharm. Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 596 (1993))).
135. Gee v. United States, 54 A.3d 1249, 1253 (D.C. 2012).
136. Id. at 1262.
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notice of the friction ridge analysis discussion in the NAS Report as
a learned treatise, concluding that “although appellant was not able
to cite to or quote from the NAS Report, . . . questioning defense
counsel pursued on cross-examination addressed the concerns
137
raised in the Report.” Defense counsel’s opportunity to conduct
cross-examination, even without relevant literature, was sufficient
to reject Gee’s claim, demonstrating the court’s view that the
adversarial system—even without props—is sufficient to adequately
138
highlight fragilities in forensic evidence.
In People v. Luna, Luna appealed his first-degree murder
conviction, arguing that the trial court should have excluded
expert testimony that a latent print found on a napkin matched his
palm print or that he should have been granted a Frye hearing
because the controversy surrounding fingerprint identification
demonstrated that the relevant scientific community did not
“generally accept” the method used to match latent prints to
139
known prints. The appeals court acknowledged that the NAS
Report and other literature included “direct criticisms to specific
claims from latent print examiners,” however, the court concluded
that the forum for airing such criticisms was cross-examination,
stating, “Before the jury, the examining attorney ‘may expose shaky
but admissible evidence by vigorous cross-examination or the
140
presentation of contrary evidence.” Luna’s claims were rejected
on the basis of defense counsel’s thorough examination of the
state’s expert—especially regarding his ability to draw a conclusion
as to the palm print—and also questionable reliability of latent
print identification given past mistaken fingerprint identifications
141
and the subjective nature of comparison.
C.

The Doctrine of Finality

The cases detailed above all demonstrated the influence of
finality on judicial decision making between 2009 and 2014. This
influence is unsurprising. The obvious theoretical reason for why

137. Id. at 1268.
138. Id.
139. People v. Luna, 989 N.E.2d 655, 659 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013), appeal denied,
996 N.E.2d 20 (Ill. 2013).
140. Id. (quoting Donaldson v. Cent. Ill. Pub. Serv. Co., 767 N.E.2d 314, 330
(Ill. 2002)).
141. Id. at 674.
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courts restrict any post-conviction review is finality. As Professor
Sperling describes:
[P]ost-conviction procedures grow out of a strong
tradition that values the finality of criminal convictions.
Finality in the criminal law context means that the case is
over, with no avenues remaining to challenge the
conviction. Finality assigns guilt, puts the case to rest, and
assures all parties that it will not be re-opened. Assuming
that the criminal process is error-free, finality serves the
ends of justice. Theoretically, once the system convicts the
right person and assesses the right punishment, society is
better off when prosecutors, law enforcement
professionals, defense attorneys, and judges move on to
142
other concerns.
143
The concept of finality developed out of a “taxonomy”
detailed by Professor Paul Bator in his landmark 1963 article,
144
Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners.
Professor Bator “laid the intellectual groundwork for the Supreme
Court’s post-trial review jurisprudence and has been cited in
145
hundreds of law review articles and court opinions.” “Bator
argued that the finality of criminal judgments serves important
146
interests that are harmed by expansions of post-trial rights” and
proposed that, because we can never be 100 percent certain that no
error of law or fact was made during trial (or appellate)
proceedings, “we must impose an end to litigation at some point or
147
else the case could conceivably go on ad infinitum.” As Professor
Sigmund Popko summarized:
Essentially, Bator argues we must acknowledge that
human systems, because fallible humans design them, are
themselves inherently fallible. Thus, we must “come to
terms with the possibility of error inherent in any
[human] process.” The best way to deal with this
probability of human error, he continues, is to design our
systems of justice with sufficient procedures and
arrangements such that there exists an “acceptable
142. CONTROVERSIES IN INNOCENCE CASES IN AMERICA, supra note 8, at 140.
143. Kim, supra note 17, at 568.
144. Bator, supra note 20, at 451–53.
145. Kim, supra note 17, at 568.
146. Id.
147. Sigmund G. Popko, Putting Finality in Perspective: Collateral Review of
Criminal Judgments in the DNA Era, 1 L.J. SOC. JUST. 75, 76 (2011).
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probability that justice will be done, that the facts found
148
will be ‘true’ and the law applied ‘correct.’”
Bator answered the question of why the criminal justice system
needs finality by considering a series of “‘very real’ consequences of
149
endless litigation.” Decades later, criminal law is very familiar with
the notion that finality is not a singular “consequence” but rather
“shorthand for a collection of interests scholars assume are
150
furthered by any restrictions on review.” Finality assumes that
providing defendants broader post-conviction rights harms these
151
society-desired interests.
Consequently, when considering
appeals, judges must balance society’s interests in finality against
152
the rights of defendants.
Of course, finality does serve the
interests of defendants as well, including their interests “not to be
subject to repetitive trials, [and to] be able to move on in their
lives” and not to be caught by repetitive state attempts at trying a
case (and its luck) that “wear down the resources and stamina of
153
As it stands, however, the scales are not
[the] defendant.”
commonly tipped in favor of defendants, with finality often being
used as a “trump card that presumptively outranks defendants’
154
interests.”
As Laurie Levenson stated, “The criminal justice
system is obsessed with finality. While it professes to focus on
obtaining fair and accurate results, the goal of finality is never far
155
away.”
Unsurprisingly, therefore, “courts have fully embraced the
156
concept of finality,” especially for criminal cases, with judges and
scholars routinely asserting that restricting defendants’ post157
conviction arsenal benefits society. However, trial courts’ use of
finality to rationalize decisions to allow the admission of fingerprint

148. Id. (citing Bator, supra note 20, at 448–51).
149. Id. at 77.
150. Kim, supra note 17, at 568.
151. Id. at 573.
152. Id. at 566.
153. Laurie L. Levenson, Searching for Injustice: The Challenge of Postconviction
Discovery, Investigation, and Litigation, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 545, 552–53 (2014).
154. Kim, supra note 17, at 573 (citing Erwin Chemerinsky, Thinking About
Habeas Corpus, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 748, 772–75 (1987)); Popko, supra note 147,
at 75.
155. Levenson, supra note 153, at 551.
156. Popko, supra note 147, at 77.
157. Id.
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identification evidence arguably overlooks the limitations of the
adversarial system.
Part IV, therefore, will discuss the implications of trial courts’
reliance on finality to rationalize their decisions by considering the
problems lawyers and jurors encounter when dealing with scientific
evidence.
IV. THE IMPLICATIONS OF FINALITY: LAWYERS, JURORS, AND SCIENCE
Law needs science to help it understand “the world in which
158
As Faigman stated, “Without
legal policy must operate.”
159
[science], legal policy is literally blinded.” On the face of it,
science and law seemingly share a mutually convenient and
somewhat placid relationship. Lawyers look to science for certainty
in the face of difficult legal questions and decisions, and science
160
seemingly responds with an answer.
However, there is tension at the intersection of law and
science. As one scholar stated, “No matter how organized and
thorough scientific theories reach, they simply cannot foresee and
161
solve every case or legal problem.”
Law and science clash
culturally because of their different approaches to the world. A
common way of describing their relationship is as follows: “Science
progresses while law builds slowly on precedent. Science assumes
that humankind is determined by some combination of nature and
nurture, while law assumes that humankind can transcend these
influences and exercise free will. Science is a cooperative endeavor,
162
while most legal institutions operate on an adversary model.”
With regard to law’s use of science to shape the criminal
process, one key issue is how non-scientists (i.e., most lawyers and
jurors) handle scientific evidence. Unfortunately, there is ample
evidence to suggest that neither cohort, generally, handles such
evidence very well. These groups generally have “little
163
understanding of the product they are buying.” This lack of
understanding is particularly problematic because courts reject

158.
159.
160.

FAIGMAN, supra note 26, at 26.
Id.
Alex R. Hess, Book Review, 9 J. HIGH TECH. L. 1, 1 (2009) (reviewing ROBIN
FELDMAN, THE ROLE OF SCIENCE IN LAW (2009)).
161. Id.
162. FAIGMAN, supra note 26, at 56.
163. Id. at 53.
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challenges to fingerprint identification evidence largely on the
basis that the adversarial process (i.e., defense counsel) exposes
issues with fingerprint identification evidence via cross-examination
and jurors will make appropriate assessments about the accuracy
164
and weight of such evidence.
A.

Lawyers and Scientific Evidence

Relying on the lawyer’s ability to cross-examine is problematic
165
for various reasons. First, lawyers are generally not scientists. As
Professor Faigman stated, “Not only do they not have training in
the particular subject [of science], they have a more profound
disability: most . . . lack the ability to judge whether proffered
166
research is good science, bad science, or science at all.” Professor
Fredric Lederer noted “lawyers generally lack significant scientific
training. This educational deficiency often places lawyers at a
disadvantage when confronted with scientific evidence . . . .
[L]awyers . . . often fail to ask the right questions and uncritically
167
accept scientific assertions.” The NAS Report recognized this was
a significant issue too, stating over ten times that “lawyers and
judges often have insufficient training and background in scientific
methodology, and they often fail to fully comprehend the
approaches employed by different forensic science disciplines and
168
the reliability of forensic science evidence that is offered in trial.”
Lawyers can overlook even the most accessible and vital
information as a consequence of an inability to engage with
science. Michael Saks gave the following example:
The [NAS] was asked by the FBI to evaluate voice
spectrography used for the purpose of identifying
suspects, and the Academy assembled a diverse and firstrate panel of experts to examine the scientific evidence
on the question. The Academy published a detailed
report of their conclusions, which the FBI promptly
adverted to. Lawyers in trials around the country failed to
164. See supra Sections III.A–.B.
165. See supra Sections III.A–.B.
166. FAIGMAN, supra note 26, at 54.
167. Fredric I. Lederer, Scientific Evidence—An Introduction, 25 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 517, 519–20 (1984).
168. See Jessica D. Gabel, Forensiphilia: Is Public Fascination with Forensic Science a
Love Affair or Fatal Attraction?, 36 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 233,
236 (2010) (citing NAS Report, supra note 9, at 27).
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find and bring the report to the attention of judges,
judges failed to find the report, and several courts which
169
clearly knew of the report failed to learn from it.
Saks concluded that “the adversary process failed to motivate
lawyers to find and offer the most important evidence on the
170
subject at issue.” These deficiencies are often attributed to a
science and math “black hole in legal education—a black hole that
171
becomes harder to close the more removed it is from law school.”
Consequently, as Professor Jessica Gabel stated, “As lawyers, we are
172
ill-equipped to speak the language of science.”
Second, defense counsel often has limited resources. The
availability of resources is an important dimension to the discussion
surrounding the restriction of post-conviction review on the basis of
173
incentivizing defense counsel to perform effectively at trial. As
Kim explained, however, “Although this reasoning is persuasive in
the abstract, as a practical matter, reducing the number of trial
errors would generally require attorneys to spend more time and
174
resources representing each client.” Most attorneys already ration
the time they have with each client, so although restricted postconviction review may make defense counsel want to provide
enhanced representation, it “will generally have little effect on the
175
actual representation they provide.” Forensic experts can be
176
expensive to hire and their applications can be time-consuming.
Counsel cannot “magic up” these resources (along with an
adequate scientific knowledge to engage competently with the
expert) simply because post-conviction review is limited.
Third, the adversarial system itself is limited. By “confronting
jurors with counter-scenarios and competing arguments, the
adversarial processes are supposed to provide an effective antidote

169. Saks, supra note 1, at 1137.
170. Id.
171. Gabel, supra note 168, at 257–58.
172. Id. at 258.
173. Kim, supra note 17, at 564.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. See Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 126
(2008) (“Our system of criminal review certainly does not privilege factual claims.
Locating an alibi witness, obtaining experts to challenge forensic evidence or
undermine eyewitness identifications, or presenting evidence of defendants’ lack
of capacity requires substantial resources and time.”).
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177

to heuristic biases” involved in forensic evidence. Heuristic biases
are defined as “unconscious cognitive tendencies to oversimplify
the evaluation of uncertain probabilities in all facets of decision
178
making.” These biases can explain why jurors tend to overvalue
“big matches” (between a latent print and a suspect print) and
179
undervalue “small non-matches.” As explained below, if an expert
testifies that there is a “match,” jurors tend to infer a higher
probability that the defendant was the source of the suspect
180
evidence.
However, several researchers argue adversarial procedures do
not provide effective antidotes to such biases. There are two main
reasons for this:
First, even experts trained to recognize the ill-effects of
cognitive biases unwittingly succumb to them. We should
not assume, therefore, that lawyers are immune and can
effectively wean jurors from these errors. Even if both
sides are equally prone to mistakes, there is no reason to
expect the mistakes as a whole to neutralize each other in
181
regard to the search for the truth in a given case.
Second, the state and defense “are unlikely to be similarly
situated in relation to representativeness, simulation, confirmation,
182
certainty, [or] uniqueness.”
For example, a party with a
fingerprint or other “big” supporting evidence may have a heuristic
bias advantage.
Even if the other side has an equally strong case . . . if
making that case requires aggregation of the weight of
many bits of “small” evidence, that party will get no
uniqueness bounce and instead will be disadvantaged by
multiple irrelevance fallacies. . . . [T]ogether with the
various heuristic fallacies, the state’s monopoly over
crime-scene evidence and first crack at key witnesses
causes exactly this uneven distribution of advantages to

177. Liebman et al., supra note 5, at 650.
178. Id. at 624.
179. Id.
180. See Dawn McQuiston-Surrett & Michael Saks, Communicating Opinion
Evidence in the Forensic Identification Sciences: Accuracy and Impact, 59 HASTINGS L. J.
1159, 1165 (2008).
181. Liebman et al., supra note 5, at 650.
182. Id. at 650–51.
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recur, systematically favoring the prosecution over the
183
defense.
Moreover, research suggests that cross-examination and
rebuttal witnesses do not necessarily dilute the impact of such
testimony,
especially
testimony
suggesting
or
stating
“individualization” given by experts. Scholars have explained that,
“unfortunately, cross-examination and the use of opposing experts
do not appear to effectively counter expert testimony, regardless of
184
the logical vulnerability of the initial expert testimony.” Professor
Beecher-Monas has reported similar finding in mock jury studies:
For example, in mock jury studies about the effectiveness
of cross-examination, it apparently made little difference
whether the defense challenged the expert testimony;
whether the defense pointed out in cross examination
that the expert’s conclusions were inconsistent with prior
research and that the expert had not followed standard
methodology; whether the defense not only crossexamined the prosecution expert, but also put on its own
expert. Although the jurors discussed the expert evidence
in their deliberations, and although there was a strong
correlation between the prosecution expert’s testimony
and the jury’s verdict preferences, the results did not vary
185
among the first three conditions.
As a result, the adversarial process does not guarantee a cure
for “shaky” expert forensic evidence. In light of these points, the
courts’ reliance on defense counsel is perhaps too optimistic. Many
lawyers are likely to be tackling fingerprint identification cases with
“blunt tools,” including their own restricted scientific knowledge
and ability to engage with scientific evidence, limited resources,
and a low-impact and/or depleted adversarial arsenal. Courts
should recognize these limitations when considering challenges to
fingerprint identification evidence. Before restricting postconviction review (or other motions) on the basis that counsel
should “get it right the first time,” courts should recognize that is
likely impossible to do.

183. Id.
184. McQuiston-Surrett & Saks, supra note 180, at 1189.
185. Erica Beecher-Monas, Reality Bites: The Illusion of Science in Bite-Mark
Evidence, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1369, 1407 (2009).
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Jurors and Scientific Evidence

The courts’ approach to challenges to fingerprint evidence
also relies heavily on jurors. At present, the courts’ approach
appears to assume that jurors can evaluate such evidence accurately
with ease. This assumption, however, neglects a meaningful
assessment of how scientific evidence impacts jurors and how jurors
digest scientific evidence. Trial courts’ trust in jurors to evaluate
such evidence accurately might well be misplaced. Like lawyers, the
186
vast majority of jurors are not scientists. Consequently, many have
difficulty engaging with scientific evidence accurately, and, in
particular, determining the appropriate weight to afford to specific
187
evidence. There is ample evidence that jurors consider forensic
evidence “especially critical to their ultimate decision about
188
189
guilt,” have a thirst for scientific evidence, and expect to see it,
“particularly in cases where the majority of evidence is
190
circumstantial.” Research has also found that jurors have inflated
191
As such, their ability to attach
expectations of science.
appropriate weight to forensic identification evidence is
questionable.
This is an especially relevant consideration in forensic
identification cases given that the ability of many forensic
disciplines (including that of friction ridge analysis) to make
“matches” has come under fire in recent years, and since 2005,
there has been a move towards curtailing expert testimony by some
192
courts. For example, McQuiston-Surrett and Saks conducted a
186. FAIGMAN, supra note 26, at 53.
187. See Valeria P. Hans, Judges, Juries, and Scientific Evidence, 16 J.L. & POL’Y 19,
23 (2007) (stating that jurors can have difficulty understanding scientific and
technical evidence, particularly DNA evidence).
188. Pete Frick, Forensic Science in Court: Challenges in the Twenty-First Century, 27
SYRACUSE J. SCI. & TECH. L. REP. 145, 156 (2012); see also DONALD E. SHELTON,
FORENSIC SCIENCE IN COURT: CHALLENGES IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 102 (2011).
189. Donald E. Shelton et al., A Study of Juror Expectations and Demands
Concerning Scientific Evidence: Does the “CSI Effect” Exist?, 9 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.
331, 333 (2006) (discussing how jurors have high expectations that scientific
evidence will be presented at criminal trials—expectations that translate into
“demands for scientific evidence as a condition of guilt”).
190. Frick, supra note 188, at 157.
191. Shelton et al., supra note 189, at 333.
192. This has mostly been the case in firearms identification evidence cases.
See Collision of Law and Science, supra note 9, at 287 (“A number of American courts
have changed their approach to the admissibility of firearms identification
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study examining the impact on jurors of variations in the
193
presentation of a forensic expert’s findings. The study varied the
language and concepts by which the expert communicated the
results of his examination that related to the forensic discipline of
194
microscopic hair comparisons.
The study found that jurors
inferred a higher probability that the defendant was the source of
the crime scene hair when the expert testimony was presented in
the form of a “match,” “similar-in-all-microscopic-characteristics,”
or as an objective single-probability, than when it was presented in
195
a subjective-probability or objective multiple-frequency format. It
also found that the evidence had a significant impact on the juror’s
196
determination of guilt.
The study showed that jurors often
deferred to the opinion of experts when expert opinions were
197
presented as a final conclusion about the evidence presented.
Jurors became more likely to find liability from “subjective
probability” if expert opinions were presented in the form of
198
definitive conclusions. The study further revealed that jurors had
difficulties “understanding statistical, and especially probability,
199
data,” and that they “underutilize[d] such information.”
Interestingly, this study also found that judges were less influenced
by the expert’s testimony than jurors, and arrived at lower
probability estimates that the defendant was the source of the
200
crime scene evidence.
Such findings raise the possibility of
whether judges substitute their own ability (and assessment of the
evidence) for that of jurors, and are therefore overly trusting of
jurors’ ability to employ appropriate scrutiny to forensic evidence
and afford it appropriate weight.

evidence between 2004 and 2011. All of the aforementioned cases (except
Santiago, Hicks, and Natson) have moved firearms examiners away from making
claims of individualization by restricting them to specific terminology and phrases,
which allegedly reflect less absolute conclusions.”). Some courts have curtailed
fingerprint identification evidence too, however. See Commonwealth v. Gambora,
933 N.E.2d 50, 61 n.2 (Mass. 2010); supra Part II.
193. McQuiston-Surrett & Saks, supra note 180, at 1165.
194. Id. at 1164.
195. Id. at 1165.
196. Id. at 1165–66.
197. Id. at 1188.
198. Id. at 1188–89.
199. Id. at 1189.
200. Id. at 1188–89.
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Courts’ decisions in labeling fingerprint identification heard
by jurors (rightly or wrongly) as “harmless” also raise this
201
concern. For instance, in Illinois v. Morris, Morris appealed his
first-degree murder conviction, arguing that his counsel was
ineffective for failing to request an admissibility hearing regarding
202
the fingerprint evidence against him. The state’s expert testified
that a palm print recovered from a bloody shovel found at the
203
crime scene matched Morris’ palm print. The court rejected his
argument, reasoning that he did not suffer prejudice because, even
without the fingerprint evidence, “there was still overwhelming
204
evidence that he was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” This
other evidence included that Morris was angry and acted
aggressively towards the victim, he was observed leaving the victim’s
house just prior to the discovery of the murder, and that the blood
on his clothing matched the victim’s DNA profile. Somewhat
similarly, in 2014, in Abdul-Salaam v. Beard, the appellant appealed
his convictions for multiple violent offenses, claiming recent
scientific developments undermined the “reliability and
205
admissibility of [the] fingerprint evidence” against him. The state
presented evidence that his prints “matched” a print found on an
206
extension cord wrapper at the crime scene. In rejecting the
argument, the court stated:
Appellant’s argument conveniently overlooks that even in
the absence of such fingerprint evidence, there was
201. This judicial “trend” is very noticeable in post-conviction challenges to
firearms identification evidence cases. In those cases, courts are relying on another
value of finality; namely, the prevention of non-controversial claims flooding the
system. A review of firearms appeals cases shows that courts often conclude the
admission of “[firearms identification] evidence at trial [i]s ‘non-prejudicial’ in
light of other evidence against the defendant. In other words, courts are terming
the (legally sound or unsound) admission of firearms identification evidence as
non-controversial.” Challenges to Firearms Identification, supra note 20, at 458–60.
Again, this rationale arguably overlooks the impact scientific evidence has on
jurors, with numerous studies showing jurors place special trust in experts and
scientific evidence. Moreover, studies have shown jurors to rate firearms
examiners as among the most honest, competent, and influential experts. It also
overlooks the complications jurors have in relation to understanding such
evidence. See id.
202. Illinois v. Morris, 997 N.E.2d 847, 870 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013).
203. Id. at 850.
204. Id. at 872.
205. Abdul-Salaam v. Beard, 16 F. Supp. 3d 420, 466 (M.D. Pa. 2014).
206. Id.
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overwhelming eyewitness testimony placing Appellant at
the scene of the crime. At least four persons who were at
the scene of the crime testified that Appellant shot the
police officer. Thus, even if we were to accept Appellant’s
argument regarding the fingerprint evidence, Appellant is
simply unable to show that the evidence would have
207
altered the outcome of the trial.
“[R]esearch suggests that statements made by experts are
given considerable deference by jurors and their impact is unlikely
to be undone either through cross-examination or rebuttal
208
witnesses.” It is even suggested that jurors feel more inclined to
credit an expert’s testimony when subjected to vigorous crossexamination and more skeptical about the reliability of a
defendant’s rebuttal evidence. As one study concluded:
One might have expected an explication of the
examination process, emphasizing the guesswork
involved, would have a sobering effect on fact finders, but
it appears instead to lead fact finders to be more
impressed by the examination. Similarly, since most jurors
begin with an exaggerated view of the nature and
capabilities of forensic identification, one might expect
that information explicitly informing fact finders about
the limitations of the expertise would temper the jurors’
inferences. Such information had little effect on jurors’
209
judgments.
Moreover jurors are not presented with the full picture.
Instead, juries “hear highly practiced alternative stories that only
210
roughly approximate what might be termed reality.” In terms of
expert testimony, because of the adversarial model, “information
that reaches the legal system [and hence the jury] does not
211
represent the scientific field more generally.” Very often, jurors
are presented with experts at the “margins of their disciplines” who
are “chosen . . . because they are willing to be . . . more certain of

207. Id.
208. Jonathan J. Koehler & Michael J. Saks, Individualization Claims in Forensic
Science: Still Unwarranted, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 1187, 1206 (2010).
209. McQuiston-Surrett & Saks, supra note 180, at 1188.
210.
FAIGMAN, supra note 26, at 65.
211. Id. at 54.
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212

their conclusions.” This approach gives jurors the impression that
213
the relevant scientific field is more polarized than it actually is.
In light of this, trial courts’ trust in jurors to assess fingerprint
identification evidence accurately and place appropriate weight on
such evidence is also, arguably, too optimistic. Fingerprint evidence
has a persuasive impact on already science-thirsty jurors, who find
comfort in expert certainty and have general difficulties with
engaging in scientific evidence accurately. Courts should recognize
this when considering challenges to fingerprint identification
evidence. Before restricting post-conviction review (or other
motions) on the basis that such evidence is best judged by the jury,
courts should give more meaningful consideration to the problems
jurors face when confronted by scientific evidence.
V. CONCLUSION
Fingerprint identification evidence has been admitted into
U.S. courtrooms for over a century. The NAS Report breathed life
into cases where defendants had been convicted in whole or in part
by fingerprint evidence. Between 2009 and 2014, many defendants
have argued (with and without using the Report) that fingerprint
identification evidence is unreliable and should not have been
admitted against them. Despite concerns about the discipline’s
ability to engage in individualization, however, courts continue to
strongly favor the admission of fingerprint identification evidence,
including claims of, or akin to, individualization. Case law
examined in this article shows that there is a general trend by
courts to rely on the adversary process to remedy concerns about
the reliability of fingerprint evidence. By focusing on the filtering
effects of the adversary process, and in particular the role of
defense counsel, as a basis for rejecting challenges to the veracity of
fingerprint evidence, the courts have been relying upon the key
finality interest of incentivizing defense counsel to prevent errors at
trial level. This rationale, however, is problematic.
This article argues that by rationalizing their decisions in this
way, judges are overlooking important difficulties both lawyers and
jurors have in relation to engaging with forensic identification
evidence. It is likely that defense counsels are tackling fingerprint
identification evidence with “blunt tools,” including their own
212.
213.

Id.
Id.

8. Cooper_CP (756-790) (Do Not Delete)

5/2/2016 9:26 PM

790

[Vol. 42:756

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

scientific knowledge and ability to engage with scientific evidence
accurately, limited resources, and a low-impact and/or depleted
adversarial arsenal. Moreover, research shows that jurors are drawn
towards alleged expert certainty, have inflated expectations of
science, and also have general difficulties with engaging in
scientific evidence accurately. As a result, jurors generally struggle
to assess forensic identification evidence and afford it appropriate
weight.
Professor Murphy recently concluded that by choosing “finality
at all costs,” the criminal justice system is “destined to court either
214
scandal or injustice, and perhaps both.” This statement should
resonate in cases involving challenges to forensic identification
evidence, given nearly half of the now over 330 post-conviction
DNA evidence exonerations in America are attributable, in some
215
way, to invalidated and/or improper forensic evidence. In light of
this, and the points raised in this article, the courts should consider
taking new perspectives on finality in such cases, and give more
meaningful consideration to the issues that arise when law
consumes science in this way.

214. Murphy, supra note 18, at 672.
215. For an excellent discussion about the intersection of innocence and
finality, see CONTROVERSIES IN INNOCENCE CASES IN AMERICA, supra note 8.

